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A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECT OF COMPUTERS ON PRIVACY
JOHN

T.

SOMA* AND RICHARD A. WEHMHOEFER**

INTRODUCTION

Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed that "as every man goes through life
he fills in a number of forms for the record, each containing a number of
There are thus hundreds of little threads radiating from
questions ....
every man." 1 Computer technology collects, combines, and analyzes these
threads in an efficient and timely manner. 2 An increasing amount of information is being collected by government and private industry. This information includes data collected from census and tax files, medical and credit
reports, arrest and criminal records, and magazine subscription files. When
accumulated in centralized data files, this information has the potential of
being used as an instrument of control or, at the very least, may be used to
3
Many comtrace and regulate an individual's movements and activities.
mentators are concerned that the computer's insatiable appetite for information, image of infallibility, and eternal memory may cause it to become the
heart of a surveillance system that will make society a transparent world in
which our homes, finances, and associations will be bared to a wide range of
4
observers.
The use of collected data, however, is indispensable in our modern society. Personal information in both individual and aggregated contexts is in.
J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver, College of Law. B.A.,
Augustana College; J.D., M.A., Ph.D., University of Illinois, Urbana. Dr. Soma is currently
completing a book on Computer Technology and the Law for Shepard's/McGraw-Hill.
** J.D., Ph.D., associated with Akolt, Dick & Akolt, Denver, Colorado. B.A., M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Colorado, Boulder; M.P.A., Graduate School of Public Affairs, University
of Colorado, Denver; J.D., University of Denver, College of Law. Dr. Wehmhoefer is currently
writing a book on Practical Statistics for Lawyers.
1. Linowes, Must Personal Privacy Die in the Computer Age,', 65 A.B.A. J. 1180 (1979). A
fundamental issue of privacy is the amount of freedom each individual possesses. Freedom is of
course directly related to the number of people in a defined space. Herbert wrote that beyond a
critical point,
within a finite space, freedom diminishes as numbers increase. This is as true of
humans in the finite space of a planetary ecosystem as it is of gas molecules in a sealed
flask. The human question is not how many can possibly survive within the system,
but what kind of existence is possible for those who do survive.
F. HERBERT, DUNE 493 (1965).
2. Seegenerally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 158-68 (1967); Bazelon, Probing Prtacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587 (1977).
3. See A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 38-46. This fear resulted in considerable opposition to
both the government's proposed National Data Center in 1967 and President Reagan's proposal
in 1981 to create a centralized data file in the Department of Health and Human Services in
order to track welfare recipients.
4. See, e.g., V. FERKISS, TECHNOLOGICAL MAN 227 (1969); Miller, The NationalDataCenter
and PersonalPrtacy, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1967, at 53; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
353 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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creasingly needed to understand and formulate policies to solve social,
economic, and political problems. Prior to the development of the computer, vast data collection and interpretation were not possible. 5 Some contemporary prophets have predicted that the advent of these new information
transfer technologies will prove to be as significant as the invention of mova6
ble type.
An inherent problem in the development of computers is its effect on
individual privacy. This article will examine that effect from historical, contemporary, and futuristic perspectives. It will also evaluate contemporary
constitutional, judicial, and statutory responses to the protection of individual privacy in the United States and internationally.
The simplest definition of privacy was stated by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Olmsteadv. Untled Stales. 7 He said that privacy is "the right to be
left alone." 8 Other more comprehensive definitions of privacy include Professor Westin's statement that privacy is "the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." 9 Professor Emerson noted
that "[tihe right of privacy, in short, establishes an area excluded from the
In this articollective life, not governed by the rules of collective living.'"
cle, privacy will be defined as the unitary concept of separation of self from
society.
I.

COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AS RELATED TO PRIVACY

After World War II, the United States witnessed a tremendous expansion of commercial and governmental activities, which resulted in a substantial increase in the volume of transactions requiring the maintenance of
records on individuals. The number of bank checks written doubled and the
5. Ruggles, Symposium. Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy: On the Needs and Values
of Data Banks, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 233 (1968).
6. A. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 265-79 (1962); H. KAHN & A. WIENER, THE
YEAR 2000, at 88-98 (1967); M. McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 11-279 (1962); A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 163-68.
An example of the scientific community's views of the impact of the computer on our
society is the following excerpt from a speech by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, reprinted in Computer Privacy: Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Comm. on the Judiiary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1967):
Springing from our Scientific Revolution of recent decades is what is being called our
"Cybernetic Revolution." This revolution which, comparatively speaking, is only in
its infancy today amplifies (and will to a large extent replace) man's nervous system.
Actually, this is an understatement because computers amplify the collective intelligence of men-the intelligence of society-and while the effect of the sum of man's
physical energies may be calculated, a totally different and compounded effect results
from combining facts and ideas . . . . Add this effect to the productive capacity of
the machine driven by an almost limitless energy source like the nucleus of the atom
and the resulting system can perform feats almost staggering to the imagination. That
is why I refer to cybernation as a quantum jump in our growth.
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. Id at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
9. A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7.
10. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 545 (1970).
11. id
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number of income tax returns quadrupled.1 2 Automated data processing
blossomed into a separate industry, serving the demands of business and in13
dustry for fast, accurate, and efficient data handling.
During the late 1960's, business and social planners began to use the
concept of systems analysis, which involves the mathematical simulation of a
complex activity or task. Systems analysis was applied to problems concerning health care delivery, income transfer payments, air pollution, urban
transportation, and higher education. The introduction of the disciplined
methods of computer-assisted management gave business and social planners
new tools for evaluating the performance of programs and institutions dealing with social problems. This auditing process included tracking transactions between organizations and their clients, measuring performance
against goals, providing information for planning, and assessing workload
and productivity.
Many of these functions necessarily involved the collection and storage
of data on individuals. For example, administrative data were needed for
management of individual transactions and statistical data were needed for
planning and assessing program performance. Intelligence data were needed
for judging individual character and qualifications for employment, credit,
welfare assistance, and other aid. Health data were needed to provide adequate health care and medical assistance. The demand generated by all
these uses of personal data, and the corresponding record-keeping systems to
store and process this information, challenged conventional legal and social
controls to protect individual privacy.
Computer technology can be expected to continue to improve the capacity, speed, and complexity of storing and analyzing data concerning individuals. The federal government continues to sponsor the development of
advanced computer systems for the military and space programs. Strong,
world-wide economic pressures exist for automating various operations in
the public and private sectors. Public opinion is becoming increasingly receptive to the provision of better data and faster information processing.
There has been a tremendous infusion of venture capital into computer development to the extent that this has been described as the "last frontier of
14
entrepreneural capitalism."'
Given this pattern of rapid innovation and technological development,
policymakers have legitimate concerns that computer technology can severely impinge on individual privacy. As early as 1972, Professor Westin
found that computer technology existed that could maintain an on-line file
containing the equivalent of twenty single-spaced pages of typed informa12. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 7-10 (1973).
13. Segenerally B. GILCHRIST & R. WEBER, THE STATE OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY IN
THE UNITED STATES 54 (1973); M. HOLOIEN, COMPUTERS AND THEIR SOCIETAL IMPACT 4344 (1977); E. TOMESKI & H. LAZARUS, PEOPLE-ORIENTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS: THE COMPUTER IN CRISIS 130-32 (1975).

14. Michael Shields, a catalogue marketer for Apple Computers said that "living [in the
Silicon Valley of northern California] is like riding in the nose cone of the space shuttle. We are
riding into the future." Taylor, Striking it Rich.- A New Breed of Risk Takers is Betting on the High
Technology Future, TIME, Feb. 15, 1982, at 38.
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tion about the personal history and selected activities of every man, woman,
and child in the United States.15 It would have been possible to retrieve this
information on any given individual within thirty seconds. 6
Although Americans enjoy the convenience and speed of information
processing, a recent Harris poll found that nearly two-thirds of those interviewed were concerned about threats to their privacy; one-third said that the
United States is or would soon be similar to the fictional "Oceania" in
George Orwell's novel 198?41 7-a nation that kept every activity of its citizens under constant surveillance.18
A.

Major Areas of Computer Technology That WVi Affect Privacy
1.

Input

Direct-entry input devices and optical scanning methods represent techniques by which data, either numeric or alphabetic, can be entered directly
into machine-readable form. Some forecasters believe voice input devices
will become widespread by the late 1980's. 19
2. Storage
Larger memory storage capacities are being developed to place great
volumes of personal data into direct-access storage for on-line access. These
new techniques include laser beam technology allowing data to be stored at
20
the molecular level.
3.

Configuration Arrangements

More flexible options are available for arranging the configuration of
computer systems. Included in this array are minicomputers and personal
microcomputers which can be used for self-contained record-keeping and
data processing applications. There are also improved capacities for linking
terminals into on-line systems, thereby giving greater flexibility to organizations and government. Some organizations have become more decentralized
in their record-keeping activities while others have elected to use large, mul21
titerminal centralized systems.
4.

Data-base Management Software

Considerable
15.

improvement

is expected

in data-base management

A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 337-406 (1972).

16. Id at 321-30. While there may not exist a single giant databank to hold all this information, it is possible to link separate computer systems within a separate organization or between organizations. Given the linkage technology already available, and if problems of
common personal identifiers, compatible record formats, and appropriate software instructions
for the desired use could be worked out, there would never be a need for one central processing
unit to operate this data system.
17. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
18. Report on Prwiacy: Who is Watching You? U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 12, 1982, at 34-

37.
19.

To Each HiS Own Computer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50.

20. Seegenerally Boraiko, The Chip, 162
21.

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 921 (1982).

Seegenerally TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 12-24.
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software. The movement toward management information systems allowing
separate data files to be unified and processed will continue. Some experts
believe the continued upgrading of those systems will depend largely on an
improved understanding of business, social, and political processes, and ma22
jor administrative reforms within these organizations.
5.

Availability of Computers

The development of low-cost personal computers and relatively inexpensive terminal links into commercial time-sharing services has greatly increased the availability of computers to individuals and small organizations.
23
AlIn 1980, over $1.8 billion was spent worldwide on personal computers.
most 2.8 million computers were sold in 1981 at an average cost of approximately $2,000 each. 24 Predictions for 1985 are that over 50 million personal
computers will be sold worldwide. 25 As computers become more readily
available to individuals, more personal data will be accessible in machine
readable form.
6.

Communication Systems

Less expensive and more specialized communications systems for data
transmission have been developed. 26 Microwave systems, satellites, cable television, and laser communications have been, or will be, developed for regu27
lar use.
7.

Output Devices

More flexible and less expensive computer output technology has been
developed. Computers will more frequently be used as "support" for microfilm and microfiche systems. Consequently, the sorting and preparing of
hard-copy media through computer-output-to-microfilm devices will conhowever, the cost
tinue to grow. 28 Hardware costs will continue to decline,
29
of increasingly complex software systems will rise.
These technological advances make the computer essential for coping
with the "information explosion."' 30 It has been estimated that by 1987, six
to seven times the present volume of new information will be produced, however, the ability of computers to automate the information may approach
22. Interview with Timothy Skinner, Staff Attorney, Lowery Air Force Base, Denver,
Colo., (Dec. 22, 1982) (federal legal information through electronics).
23. TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14.
24. Strikihg it Rich, supra note 14, at 41.
25. To Each Hs Own Computer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50.

26. The break up of AT&T on January 8, 1982 will lead to the continued development of
telecommunications systems capable of providing efficient and effective methods for data transmission. See, e.g., ATLANTIC, May 1979, at 68.
27. G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 254-86 (1981).
28. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
NATIONAL SYSTEM CHALLENGE 73 (1972).

29. The Tail that Wags the Dog, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 55.
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979, § 3, at 1.

A
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3l
one hundred times the current capacity.

B.

Major Issues Resultingfrom Computer Development

Computer development and the projected use of computer technology
carry many implications for society. Four issues which have been raised con32
cerning this impact are automation, power, individuality, and privacy.
1.

Automation

Just as the Industrial Revolution enhanced man's physical strength
with machines, computational technology has begun to supplement some
aspects of human thought processes. Computers are doing work that some
people consider to be burdensome, tedious, and boring. 33 As a result, productivity and production costs have been optimized. 34 Some observers believe that computers create more jobs than they displace, while others
theorize that computers will eventually destroy many more jobs than are
35
created.
2.

Power

It is said that "information is power." Computers create the potential
for a few individuals to accumulate large amounts of data that can be readily accessed. Sophisticated computers create a power gap between those persons technically trained to interpret and use this information and those who
do not have such skills. Computers can also dictate our actions. Systems
failures, for example, can result in confusion and catastrophe. Recent system
failures such as the blackouts in New York City, the accident at Three Mile
Island, and air traffic control problems in Southern California have created
36
chaotic situations.
3.

Individuality

In the United States, the right to pursue happiness has historically been
highly valued. Computers have significantly altered this emphasis on individuality. At times, our very essence is reduced to numbers on a terminal
screen. Computers store aggregations of data such as fiscal and credit transactions, medical records, consumer habits, and communications. With access to so much accumulated data, however, social planners might easily
begin to envision a society with goals that can be dealt with in mass, rather
31. See SCIENCE NEWS, Oct. 4, 1975, at 220; Etzioni, Ejicts of Small Computers on Sctentists,
SCIENCE, July 11, 1975, at 93.
32.

W. MATHEWS, MASTER OR MESSIAH? THE COMPUTER'S IMPACT ON SOCIETY 32-36

(1980).
33. Robots are used to weld and attach machine parts for automobiles, steel work, electronic circuits, and other assembly line products. Japan has developed robots to build other
robots. SeeJapan's High- Tech Challenge, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1982, at 48.
34. See TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 72-83.
35. Machines Smarter than Men? An Interview with Robert Weiner, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
Feb. 24, 1964, at 84.
36. See TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 72-83.
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than in terms of the individual. 37
4.

Privacy

Some observers have argued against the trend to link data banks and
access information on individuals because such trends could serve as the beginning of "individual data images." '38 In particular, Professor Westin has
argued that existing computational technology capable of integrating several
data banks into networks would allow personal data provided by an individual for one purpose to be used at a later time for unrelated purposes. 39 The
likelihood that an individual would realize, much less approve of, such uses
isremote.
There appears to be little legal or social movement at this point to place
additional protections on privacy. Professor Westin has observed that privacy is a quality-of-life issue that is usually considered less important than
40
economic and foreign policy concerns.
II.

THE THREAT TO PRIVACY

The threats posed to the individual from computer technology have
been described by one commentator as: illicit access to personal information; unexpected consequences of making information freely available by
mechanical means; use of information for purposes other than those for
which it was collected; actions based on inaccurate or outdated information;
placement of the individual at a disadvantage as compared to organizations
with ready access to large amounts of computerized information; and the
undue credence given to information merely because it is stored in a computer. 4 1 Other threats include the "secrecy" of personal information; unauthorized or illicit collection methods and omissions; the visibility of the data
collection and analysis process; and the regulation of computers. 42
Another commentator has observed that the major effect of the computer on privacy is the removal of the individual from the decision of
whether personal information may be released. 43 This loss of control can
take two forms: loss of access control and loss of accuracy control. 44 When
an individual is the sole source of information, he has at least some control
over what information is disseminated to others. The advent of the computer databank added a new source of personal information over which the
individual has no access control. Related to this development is the individual's diminished control over the accuracy and reliability of the personal
information that is released through computer databanks.
37.

A. VAN TASSEL, THE COMPLETE COMPUTER 153 (1976).

38. Koehn, Privay, Our Problemfor Tomorrow, J. oF SYs. MGMT., 8-10 (July 1973).
39. See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 111-67, 317-54.
40. Id at 14-20.

41. Barron, People, Not Computers, in PRIVACY 320 (J. Young ed. 1978).
42. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

POLICY ISSUES

IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 148 (1976).

43. Beaney, The Right to
44. Id at 254.

iaqcy
andAmerican Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966).
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Key Forces Threatening Pri'vacy

As computer technology improves, the ways in which privacy may be
invaded increase. There are four forces in America that compel the need for
45
legal protections of privacy.
1.

Eavesdropping

There are increasingly more sophisticated devices available for eavesdropping. Professor Westin documented both governmental and private sector actions geared to secretly penetrate private places and intercept private
conversations. 46 The assumption that persons can carry on a conversation in
a home or room in private, is apparently no longer justified.
2.

Sophisticated Databases

When records were kept on paper and requests for information had to
be manually processed in writing, central files combining credit information,
employment histories, and arrest records were unknown. The past as well as
the present could be hidden or forgotten unless someone had the time and
resources necessary to conduct an exhaustive search. Today, government
and business maintain extensive records in computer databanks. Management information systems allow computers to be linked together to provide a
comprehensive picture of a person's finances, employment, education, and
reputation. Such systems are not immune from being tapped and having
information stolen, nor does anything exist to prevent those with legal access
47
from checking the records of selected individuals.
3.

Growing Need for Information

As the ability to process information becomes greater, the public's perception of the need for additional data expands. Professor Miller attributes
the explosion of information-keeping not only to advances in computer technology, but also to the federal government's entry into the areas of taxation
and social welfare.4 8 Many governmental agencies are beginning to ask
complex, probing, and sensitive questions. Some of these questions have required the disclosure of a person's associations, medical history, and attitudes
toward various institutions and people. 4 9 Similar trends are apparent in social science and private market analysis research where lie detector tests and
personality examinations have been used to gather data relating to such private domains as a person's sexual preferences, religious beliefs, and other
50
personal habits.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
note 18,

See Bazelon, supra note 2, at 597-600 (1977).
See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 158-68.
See, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 18, at 34-37.
See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 158-68.
See A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 21.
A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 133-70, 216-78. See alo U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra
at 35-36.
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Increased Regulation

As the population grows and resources diminish, individual economic
freedom will probably give way to increased governmental intervention.
While this larger role for government may be condemned in principle, demands for economic security, education, adequate health care, and improved criminal justice systems require increased governmental involvement.
The danger is that, while providing some benefits, the government will exert
unnecessary controls that diminish individual autonomy and privacy. 5 1
Bazelon argues that the law must increasingly intervene to guard
against the erosion of privacy through administrative regulations, statutes,
and the common law. 5 2 Whenever law affecting privacy is made by the
courts, legislature, or executive branch, policymakers should engage in simi53
lar sorts of analysis to mediate among the inevitable competing interests.
This, according to Bazelon, is probably the only way to protect privacy in
54
the future.
B.

Types of PersonalInformation

The use of computers to store personal information is exemplified by
three hypothetical composite cases in which a loan, a life insurance policy, and
a credit card are rejected. Although these cases are hypothetical, they typify
the extent to which information can be used and abused once the data is
stored in a computer.
John Smith, a forty-year-old engineer and honorably-discharged veteran, was denied a Veterans Administration (VA) guarantee on a home
mortgage. He asked to review his file at the savings and loan association
where he applied for the loan. The accepted banking practice in the United
States is to permit the applicant to review only the file, not the credit report
or the home appraisal. 55 Smith's review of the file revealed that he was
convicted of a felony in 1965. The bank official told him that the credit
report contained other adverse information and gave him the name of the
credit reporting agency that supplied this information.
Smith and his attorney called the credit reporting agency. Under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 Smith has the right to review his entire file,
except for the medical information. 5 7 Credit reporting agencies generally
base credit reports on contacts with their customers who have requested reports on individuals over the past years. They also contact references sup51. Some social commentators criticize Westin's notions of privacy and individualism as
antagonistic to the general welfare. See J. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, PRIVACY
NoMos XIII 18-23 (1971).
52. Bazelon, supra note 2, at 600.
53. A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 370-77.
54. Id
55. Banks generally consider credit reports and appraisals to be their own information.
When a potential customer completes a credit application, he consents to the bank's consulation
of practically any person or institution about his credit, character, and general reputation. See,
e.g., Annot., 98 A.L.R. 3d 561 (1980).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).

57. Id. § 1681(b).
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plied by the credit applicant. These references are usually friends,
merchants, and banks who have a record of the applicant's purchasing habits. Information from these sources, as well as from such court records as
divorce decrees, garnishments, or bankruptcy documents, are then supplied
to a requesting party such as the savings and loan association.
To Smith's surprise, his file contained a notation that he had been identified as a person known to have attacked or ridiculed a major doctrine of
the Christian faith and the American way of life. As required by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the credit reporting agency reinvestigated this notation after Smith protested. 58 It concluded that the notation, based solely on
the fact that Smith's father had been investigated in the 1950's by the House
Subcommittee on Un-American Activities, was not applicable to him. The
agency, therefore, deleted the notation from his file and notified the savings
and loan association.
The alleged felony conviction was, in fact, a conviction for civil disobedience when Smith was involved in a sit-in as a civil rights worker in the
South. The bank obtained this information from Smith's veteran's files.
The veteran's files also contained the name and address of his ex-wife. With
this information and the credit reporting agency's file, 59 the bank conducted
its own investigation. It contacted the FBI, 60 whose files also showed the
conviction.
Smith has two remedies: he may seek expungement of his criminal record or sue the VA under the Privacy Act. 6 ' Expungement is generally available only when there is either an acquittal or dismissal of the charges and a
showing of "significant abuse of authority" by the law enforcement officials. 62 Expungements have also been ordered in cases where the sole purpose of an arrest was to harass civil rights workers. 63 A suit to obtain
expungement, however, is uncertain and time consuming. A better option is
to seek a remedy under the Privacy Act. 64 If the VA refuses to amend his
military record, Smith may seek compulsion of such action through the
courts. 65 The VA can argue that it is exempt from the requirements of the
Privacy Act because its disclosure to the bank was a "routine use" of such
records. 66 Smith undoubtedly signed a waiver as part of his application for
58.

Id § 16 8 1(g).

See also A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 82 (1971); D. Linowes,

Are New Prwvacy Laws Needed-, 44 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 436 (1978).

59.
notified
Privacy
60.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). If the bank already had this information, it could have
the VA, whose activities are excluded from the provisions of the Right of Financial
Act under the circumstances described here. Id.
Id. The FBI's activities are also excluded under these circumstances.

61. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
62. See, e.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); D. Weinstein, Confidentzah y
of CriminalRecords: Orivacy v. the Pubhc Interest, 22 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1205-11 (1977), points out
that data collection, not just computerization, is at least part of the problem. The criminal
justice system has a genuine need, however, for data to prevent crime, move caseloads, and
analyze statistics.
63. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
65. See id § 552a(g)(2)(A).
66. See id § 552. The term "routine use" means, with respect to the disclosure of a record,
the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected. Id § 552a(a)(7).
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the mortgage guarantee, permitting the bank and the VA to investigate his
record and use any information they received. Any information disclosed
under the Privacy Act must be "timely" 6 7 and Smith's seventeen-year-old
conviction does not meet this requirement.
Smith's available remedies do not necessarily provide certainty of outcome and the process required to pursue these remedies is extremely timeconsuming. As a practical matter, the house Smith sought to purchase
would probably be sold to another bidder. His best non-legal remedy may
be to seek a conventional loan from another bank using a different credit
reporting agency.
Mary Brown, a thirty-year-old television reporter in perfect health and
with an excellent financial reputation, was informed that she would not be
issued an insurance policy. The insurance company notified Brown that it
had received adverse information about her that she could inspect. At the
insurance company's office Brown was shown her file with the exception of
her medical and credit reports. 68 She was, however, given the names of the
credit reporting agency and the doctors the company had contacted for this
information. The insurance company told Brown that it had received an
adverse report from the Medical Information Bureau (MIB), 69 and that this
report had been used to supplement the credit and medical reports.
The MIB, which is subject to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 70 was required to show Brown her file, excluding medical information. The file contained a report from a neighbor who stated that Brown
entertained people of questionable character at all hours and that she used
drugs. 71 Brown disputed the report and the insurance company reinvestigated. It found that the neighbor was nearly senile and disliked Brown because her dog occasionally wandered into the neighbor's yard.
The
insurance company deleted the report.
The file of the credit reporting agency contained no adverse comments.
The doctor's report, however, indicated that Brown had disclosed to her col67. Id § 552a(e)(6). The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not permit disclosures of convictions over seven years old.
68. Although this is an accepted industry practice, routine medical information, such as a
blood pressure reading, may be disclosed to the individual. Id § 552a(f)(4).
69. See Stern, Medical Information Bureau: The Life Insurer's Databank, 4 RUTGERs L.J. OF
COMPUTERS AND THE L. 1, 1-19 (1974). The MIB is an association of 700 life insurance companies whose members underwrite 90% of the life insurance policies in the United States and
Canada. Members may obtain information on the records of over 11,000,000 people contained
in the MIB's computer files. Whenever an applicant is declined life insurance, the life insurance
company reports this information to the MIB. This list is not checked for accuracy and the
person is placed on a list of "impairments." The traits of an "impairment" include nervousness,
sexual deviation, and unhealthy appearance. The purpose of the MIB is to prevent an applicant who is a poor risk and who is refused insurance by one company from applying to subsequent companies or from withholding certain information. While the MIB will not divulge
such medical information directly to an applicant, it will provide information to the applicant's
personal physician, who may then inform the applicant. Under the MIB rules, such medical
information is to be used only to supplement the life insurance company investigation. Id
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i) (1970).
71. Linowes, Must Personal Pvac.y Die in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A. J. 1180, 1182 (1979).
This was an actual case reported to the Privacy Commission in 1978.
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lege physician that her mother had been treated by a psychiatrist. 72 The
college was precluded from releasing this information under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (Act) 7 3 without Brown's consent. This
Act, however, does not provide a private remedy; it merely permits the Secretary of Education to terminate federal funds to the institution.7 4 Brown
does have a remedy against the credit reporting agency for continuing to
carry the doctor's report. The agency is precluded from disclosing the information because it is more than seven years old. 75 If the agency refuses to
both delete the information and inform the insurance company of this action, the agency may be liable for actual and punitive damages. 76 If the
agency changes its report, Brown should be issued her policy.
Richard White, a forty-year-old small businessman who owns his own
hardware store, was denied a credit card. The credit card company showed
White his file, with the exception of his credit report, and gave him the name
of the credit reporting agency. The file at the credit reporting agency revealed that shortly after graduating from college twenty years ago, White
was adjudicated as bankrupt and received welfare for a year.
Under the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, bankruptcies that
occurred over ten years prior to a report may not be disclosed. 77 The agency
is required to delete the information and inform the credit card company or
be subject to actual and punitive damages. 78 Other types of adverse information may be subject to a seven-year limitation on disclosure. 79 The agency
may not, therefore, report that White received public assistance. 80
The more interesting question is how the credit reporting agency obtained this information since these records are subject to strict requirements
of confidentiality. 8 It is possible that White's social security number was
obtained when he received public assistance 82 or when he applied for the
72. This is another actual case reported to the Privacy Commission in 1978. A young
woman was refused employment as a public school teacher because she had reportedly told her
school doctor her mother had once seen a psychiatrist. See Diamond, How to Protect Your PrIvacy,
MCCALL'S, Feb. 1980, at 51.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(i) (1976).
74. See, e.g., Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276 (8th Cir. 1977) (a former
student could not use the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act to force a college to
release his transcript after he had defaulted on his National Defense Student Loan and was
discharged in bankruptcy).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6) (1976).
76. Id. § 1681n.
77. Id. § 1681c(a)(I). The credit report is used in connection with a transaction or life
insurance policy involving an amount in excess of $49,999 or employment at a salary of $20,000
or more. There are no time restrictions placed on reporting bankruptcies.
78. Id § 1681c.
79. Id. § 1681c(2)-(6).
80. Id. U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1980). In Colorado, information on individuals who
applied for public assistance since 1972 is in computer files. Printouts of these files contain a
note that the recipient is responsible for the confidentiality of the files. See 6 Colorado Department of Social Services Manual, §§ 6.210-6.220 (effective June 1, 1983).
82. Chambers v. Klein, 419 F. Supp. 569 (D. N.J. 1976), affd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977)
(requiring disclosure of a social security number in order to secure Aid to Families With Dependent Children is neither a violation of the Privacy Act nor the Constitution). The use of social
security numbers makes it easier to access different computer files containing personal informa-
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credit card. A computer search for information based on White's social security number might reveal such information. In any case, the agency must
delete this information from its files and notify the credit card company,
which then has the discretion to issue a card based upon this changed
8 3
information.
These three cases suggest the pervasive impact that computer storage
and retrieval of personal information can have on an individual's life. The
burden of correcting inaccurate information or deleting dated material rests
most often with the individual rather than the agency. This is because in
many computerized databanks the cost to delete data is significantly higher
than the cost to store it perpetually.8 4 The real threat to privacy, therefore,
may not be the fact that computers can collect and store facts about individuals, but rather that inaccurate or dated information can be repeatedly used
to evaluate the character, reputation. employability, or credit-worthiness of
an individual. That person may never know what information was used in
the evaluation or from where the information was derived.
III.

A.

LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES

The Judital Response

Although the word "privacy" does not appear in the text of the Constitution, in the mid-1900's the Court found that such a right could be implied
from its various amendments. In NAACP v. Alabama,85 the Court found a
"vital relationship between the freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations, '8 6 ruling that the "right of the [NAACP] members to pursue
their lawful private interests . . .privately" was protected by the first and
87
fourteenth amendments.
tion. Davis, A Technologist's View ofPrivaqy and Security in AutomatedInformation Systems, 4 RUTGERS
LJ.OF COMPUTERS AND THE L. 264, 273 (1975).
83. Credit card companies are a major source of information on millions of individuals.
To obtain a credit card, the applicant must provide a significant amount of financial, credit,
and personal information. When he uses his card, information concerning items purchased,
travel movements, and financial status are posted to his account. By 1976, Master Card had
40.6 million cardholders. N. PENNEY & D.I. BAKER, THE LAw OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS § 1.01[3] (1980). Credit card companies such as American Express, VISA, and
Master Card contain specific instructions on their applications that the information requested,
and information from later transactions, will be used and exchanged by other companies. This
information is then sold to generate further profits for the credit card companies. One startling
example of how information can be used occurred when a laboratory which tested women for
pregnancy, sold its list of pregnant women to a diaper service. The diaper service mailed advertisements to the names on the list. One husband learned of his wife's pregnancy from the cheerful greeting and congratulations on the cover of the advertisement. See, Comment, The Prtvacy
Side ofthe Credit Card, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 183, 187 (1973). In Denver, Colorado, banks seem to be
concerned about protecting the confidentiality of their customers' files. Most banks keep only a
customer's balance, available credit line, and the past few months' transactions on computer
files. The rest of the customer's information is stored by month, not by name, on microfiche,
which is stored under tight security in the bank's vault. Interview with Jack D. Molloy, Law
Department of Colorado National Bankshares, Inc., in Denver, Colo. (Dec. 14, 1982).
84. Interview with James R. Young, Advisory Engineering Manager of Storage Technology Corporation, in Louisville, Colo. (Sept. 23, 1982).
85. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
86. Id at 462.
87. Id. at 466.
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In holding that a constitutional right of privacy exists, Griswold v.Connecticut 38 struck down a state statute that made it a crime to prescribe or use
contraceptive devices.8 9 Justice Douglas found a right of privacy emanating
from the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
90
amendments.
The Court, however, has been reluctant to hold that a similar right to
privacy exists for individuals in commercial settings. In 1976, the Court in
United States o. Miller 9 t held that a bank depositer has no "reasonable expectation of privacy" as to copies of checks, financial statements, and other documents that the bank depositer had supplied to the bank. 92 The Court
reasoned that because such records were merely business records, rather than
private papers, and because the depositor voluntarily revealed personal affairs to the bank by surrendering these records, he took the risk that this
93
information might be conveyed to others.
In 1972, the Court in Lairdv. Tatum 94 avoided the issue of whether the
existence of a broad system of domestic surveillance by the United States
Army "chilled" the first amendment rights of those who were the targets of
such surveillance. 95 Information concerning the activities of the plaintiffs in
this class action had been stored in a computer at Fort Holabird, Maryland. 96 This information was freely disseminated to numerous military and
civilian intelligence officials throughout the country. 9 7 The Court's holding
was limited to a finding that the mere existence of broad governmental investigative and data-gathering activities was insufficient to constitute a justiciable claim. 98 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger added that
the ruling intimated "no view with respect to the propriety or desirablity,
from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities .

. .

.

99 The dissent

pointed out that danger exists as long as computer files are kept on the membership, ideology, and policies of any political activist group in the United
States. 100
The latest Court decision dealing directly with this question of privacy
occurred in 1977. In Whalen . Roe, t 0 ' the Court held that as long as the
security of the computer is adequate and the information stored therein is
only passed to appropriate officials, sensitive information may be stored and
88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. Id at 485.
90. Id at 484. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy includes the
right to have an abortion); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). Katz held that wiretaps without a warrant or the permission of at least one of the communicating parties was an illegal search, because the wiretap
constituted an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 389 U.S. at 350-53.
91. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
92. Id at 442. See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
93. 425 U.S. at 440-43.
94. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
95. Id at 3.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id
98. Id at 10.
99. Id at 15.
100. Id at 24-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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retrieved without an invasion of a person's right to privacy.' 0 2 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the right to collect personal information "is typically accompanied" by a duty to avoid disclosure, and that
the proper concern and duty were shown in this case. 10 3 Justice Brennan,
concurred, recognizing that databanks increase the opportunity for abuse of
privacy and that future developments in computer technology may necessi04
tate a judicial curb on that technology.'
Although a number of privacy and computer-related cases have arisen
since Whalen, none have gone beyond the court of appeals level. 10 5 Consequently, the Court has yet to take up the issues foreseen by Justice Brennan.
B.

The Legislative Response: FederalSatutog Developments

As a result of growing public concern about perceived abuses of privacy
through computerized databanks and in response to the Supreme Court's
reluctance to find constitutional violations of privacy in areas such as personal credit information, Congress enacted several statutes creating remedies
for dealing with privacy violations.
1.

Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970

The first major legislation concerning credit data was the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (Act).' 0 6 The main provisions of the Act are intended to protect individuals from inaccurate reports and to prevent invasions of privacy.1 0 7 The applicability of the Act is limited to reports for credit,
employment, insurance, and related benefits.' 0 8 To guard against inaccuracies, the Act gives the individual the right to access and to challenge data
that a credit reporting agency may have in its data files. The statute also
mandates procedural requirements for imposing civil penalties on credit reporting agencies if they fail to correct inaccurate information. ' 0 9 The Act
allows the individual access to both the data and its source. If an individual
is either completely or partially denied credit based on the credit report, the
Act requires the creditor to disclose both the reason for the rejection and the
102. Id at 601-02.
103. Id at 605. Information in the databank included the names and addresses of everyone
in New York who had acquired narcotic drugs such as opium and cocaine with a doctor's
prescription. Id at 591-93. The computer's security system included a locked wire fence, an
alarm system, and off-line reading of the data files and tapes such that no computer terminal
outside the computer could read or record the information. Id at 594. The plaintiffs argued
that the availability of their names and addresses from the databank created a concern that
people in need of such drugs would refuse to seek medical assistance for fear of being discovered
and stigmatized as drug addicts. Id This argument was rejected. Id at 603-04.
104. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Ash v.
United States, 608 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980); Doe v. Webster,
606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Roberto Benlizer, 459 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1978).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976).
6
107. Id § 1 81a.
108. See ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42,
at 170.
109.

15 U.S.C. § 168In (1976).
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name and address of the credit reporting agency. 110
The Act requires that an individual be notified within six months that a
credit report has been requested. The scope and nature of the request and
the name of the creditor requesting the information must also be divulged.ll Perhaps the most important provision in the Act gives an individual the right to challenge the accuracy of information contained in the credit
reporting databank files. 1 2 As long as the challenge is neither frivolous nor
irrelevant, the agency must reinvestigate and delete information found to be
unverifiable. If the dispute is not resolved, the individual may file an account of the supposed inaccuracy with the credit reporting agency. This
account must be included in all subsequent reports that the agency passes on
to requesting creditors.
The Act also requires that reasonable procedures be followed by agencies in assuring the accuracy and proper use of credit information. 113 If an
agency is negligent in this area, an individual who is harmed may recover
actual damages, costs, and attorney's fees. "i 4 If the agency's action is willful,
punitive damages may be awarded. 1 5 Criminal penalties, including fines
up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year, may be rendered for the
willful misappropriation or unauthorized disclosure of credit information. 116
Federal courts have jurisdiction over violations without regard to the
amount in controversy.' ' 7 To guard against invasion of an individual's privacy, the Act restricts the purposes for which credit reporting agencies may
provide information. Proper uses include determining eligibility for additional credit and disclosure pursuant to a court order." l8 Limitations are
imposed on the length of time certain derogatory information may be retained by the credit reporting agency. For example, bankruptcy information
can be retained only fourteen years.' 19 Arrest records, indictments, and con120
victions can be retained for only seven years.
The Act has certain weaknesses. It lacks a formal procedure to ensure
that an individual be given due process and it provides a haphazard approach to deal with disputes about the accuracy of information in an individual's file.' 2 ' For example, objections and accounts by an individual in
unresolved disputes concerning the accuracy of credit information are not
reported retroactively to prior recipient-creditors of the individual's file.
Further, the Act only mandates that a credit reporting agency provide the
individual with an oral report of the contents of the credit files. The agency
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id
Id.
Id
Id

§
§
§
§

1681m.
1681g.
1681i.
1681e.

114. Id § 1681o.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id

121.

Se TASK FORCE, CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNICATIONS,

§ 1681n.
§§ 1681q-r.
§ 1681p.
§ 1681b.
§ 1681c.

VACY AND COMPUTERS 164 (1972).
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need not provide the individual direct access or a written copy of the file. 122
Finally, civil action remedies are difficult to obtain because the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff-individual and it is often difficult to show actual
123
monetary damages.
2.

Privacy Act of 1974

The Privacy Act (Act) 124 supplemented the Freedom of Information
Act
and was the second major piece of legislation dealing with privacy.
The Act prohibits federal government offices from disclosing personal information about an individual without his written consent, unless it falls within
one of eleven exceptions. 126 Restrictions on disclosures include not only
hard copy, but also display and telephone transmissions.' 2 7 The Act requires federal agencies to reveal their data-collection activities on individuals, to make their justifications for the collection and use of such data public,
128
and to give individuals a right of access to the collected information.
125

The right of access permits the individual to inspect the information in
the presence of a companion. He may request that corrections be made and,
if the request is denied, may file a statement of disagreement. 129 The agency
holding the information has ten days to respond to this statement. If the
agency refuses to amend the information, the individual has thirty days in
which to request a review'of that refusal. If the review supports the agency's
decision, the individual has the right to judicial review. 130 If the agency
agrees to amend the file, it must notify those to whom the record has been
disclosed.13' An agency is not required to maintain records of the entities to
which disclosures have been made.
In regulating the release of information, the federal agency is required
to disclose the name of the agency or authority requesting the information,
to determine whether the request is voluntary or mandatory, and to determine the intended uses of the information.' 32 The agency must publish an
annual notice of each record system it maintains. This notice must include:
the name of the system, its location, categories of data files maintained, routine uses and users, storage policies, retrieval, access control, retention and
disposal of data, procedures to notify individuals as to the existence of and
122.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at

174.

123.

d. at 177.

124. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
125. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.

126. The exceptions under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976) are: 1) to officers and employers of the
agency in the performance of their duties; 2) when required by statute; 3) for routine use; (4) to
the Census Bureau; 5) for statistical research; 6) to the National Archives; 7) for a civil or criminal law proceeding; 8) to protect an individual's health or safety; 9) to Congress; 10) to the
Comptroller General; and 11) pursuant to court order.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id § 552a(g)(l).
131. Id § 552a(e).
132. Id
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133
requests for their files, and inspection and challenge procedures.
Individuals who believe that their rights have been violated and who
have been denied relief from the offending agency may sue in federal court
for injunctive relief and civil damages.1 34 Damages for willful violations of
the Act are limited to $1000 plus attorney's fees. Criminal misdemeanor
charges and fines of up to $5000 can be imposed on agency employees for
willful disclosure. 135

3.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (Act) 136 permits federal funds to be terminated to any institution of higher education
that denies parents the right to inspect the educational records of their children.' 3 7 The Act does not apply to confidential letters of recommendation;
to financial statements concerning the parents of college students; or to a
38
situation where a student has waived his or her rights in these matters.'
The Act provides that funds will be denied to an institution that releases
such records to persons other than: school officials "with a need to know,"
state or federal education officials, research organizations, or persons with a
lawful subpoena.' 3 9 Private remedies are not available to students or their
parents.
4.

Freedom of Information Act

The Freedom of Information Act (Act)140 was intended to compel federal agencies to divulge various records, procedures, and statements of policy
to those requesting such information. The Act requires each agency to publish in the Federal Register 14 1 a description of the place and manner in
which the public may obtain such information. 142 Agencies are not required
to disclose information which would: constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;" jeopardize national defense; impinge upon internal personnel rules; reveal confidential financial information, trade secrets,
personnel or medical files, geological information, or agency memoranda; or
reveal investigatory records that can be obtained only by a valid subpoena.' 4 3 Persons who are refused inspection of federal records may sue to
enjoin the agency from withholding the information and recover costs and
44
attorney's fees. '
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id at 13.

136. 20 U.S.C. § 1232 g (1976).
137. Id § 12 32g(o.
138. Id § 1232g(a)(1)(B) (waivers may not be required for admission or receipt of financial
aid).
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Girardier v. Webster College,
563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id See also id § 552(a) and Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F. Supp.
1205 (D.D.C. 1976).
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5.

Tax Reform Act of 1976

The Internal Revenue Service is exempted from statutes that deny access to an individual's personal records held by third parties. The Tax Reform Act of 1976,145 however, requires that a taxpayer be notified when
are subpoened from a bank, credit reporting
records of his transactions
46
agency, or other party. 1
6.

Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978

47
was intended to restrict the fedThe Right to Financial Privacy Act'
eral government's access to financial records. In apparent response to United
States v. M/l/er, 148 Congress imposed a duty of confidentiality on financial
institutions.' 49 Financial institutions often serve as creditors and their
records are likely to contain credit reporting agency reports.
The federal government may be permitted access to such records by
securing the written consent of the individual. Other methods include ob50
Whenever the
taining: a subpoena, a court order, or a search warrant.'
federal government seeks access to financial records, the individual must be
notified. 1 5 ' Governmental access may be challenged in every instance except those in which a search warrant was obtained. A civil remedy against
52
A fine of $100 per
the government or the financial institution is available.'
be awarded.
violation, actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees may
153
Punitive damages are available, if the violation was willful.

7.

Fair Credit Billing Act

The Fair Credit Billing Act (Act) 154 enhances the protection that an
individual has from inaccuracies in credit data. Detailed provisions exist for
correcting billing errors. '55 The Act establishes a procedure for an obligor to
identify his or her account, register the alleged error, and state the reasons
for believing that an error exists. 156 The creditor has thirty days in which to
respond.' 57 Upon receiving notice from the obligor that an error might exist, the creditor may not issue an adverse report concerning the obligor's
58
credit. '
145. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
146. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
147. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
148. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
149. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,repri)tedzh 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9273, 9305-06.
150. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3406-3409 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
151. Id. § 3405.
152. Id. § 3417.
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1976).

155. I. § 1666(a).
156. Id.
157. Id

158. Id
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Federal Reports Act

Section 3508 of the Federal Reports Act' 59 restricts the exchange of information between federal agencies and imposes penalties for unauthorized
disclosures. 160 When the agency seeks to acquire confidential information
61
on an individual, its justification defense is limited by the Act.'
C.

State Legislation

Supreme Court policy has generally been to allow individual states to
define privacy rights. In Katz v. United States,' 62 the Court held that:
"[P]rotection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone
by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life,
163
left largely to the law of the individual States."'
At the state level, legal protection afforded privacy remains limited, inconsistent, and fragmented. Only ten states have provisions in their constitutions, which expressly protect privacy. 164 Seven of these states confer more
limited recognition on the privacy right by closely associating it with the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 165 Florida, for example, extends protection "against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means."' 66 The Illinois, Hawaii, Louisiana, and
South Carolina privacy provisions are broader, protecting against "invasions
of privacy."' 67 Washington and Arizona have narrower privacy provisions,
which serve as the functional equivalent of the prohibition against illegal
searches and seizures. 168
Privacy in the state context is also protected through judicial interpretation. Some state courts have imported a limited constitutional right of privacy into general provisions of their respective state constitutions. ' 69 Some
of these states later inserted an express privacy provision into the appropriate
section of their constitutions through legislation.17 0 While the notion of privacy is a relatively new area for the United States Supreme Court, it is even
newer to the states. With the exceptions of Arizona and Washington, the
right of privacy has been included in state constitutions only since 1968.
159. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

160. Idd§ 3508(b).
161. See United States v. Davey, 426 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
162. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
163. Id at 350-51 (emphasis in original).
164. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST.art. § 12; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 12; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONsT. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST.art. I, § 7. For an excellent
discussion of state legislation in the privacy area and a full text of each state's statutes, see Cope,
Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1977).
165. Id at 636.
166. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Set Cope, supra note 164, at 637.
167. See Cope, supra note 164, at 637.
168. Id
169. See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Ala. 1972) (right to be let alone concerning hair
length); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (invasion of privacy tort); Cason v.
Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (invasion of privacy tort).
170. Alaska, California, and Florida adopted privacy provisions subsequent to the dates of
the court decisions discussed supra note 169.
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State constitutional privacy provisions add another degree of protection
against such devices as computer databanks.
The experience of the states suggests that the most effective means of
protecting privacy is the adoption of a "package" of privacy measures in
state constitutions. One commentator argues that three elements are essential in such a package. The first is the inclusion of a provision relating to the
interception of communication. This provision is normally within the section on searches and seizures. The second is a freestanding right of privacy,
following the models of Alaska, California, and Montana, that protects
against governmental intrusions. Finally, appropriate language should be
included to assure that the courts and legislatures have a mandate to fashion
remedies against intrusions by the private sector.' 7 ' A state's adoption of
such a package would help protect an individual's privacy right across the
spectrum of possible invasion, including those involving computer
databanks. Most states, unfortunately, have not been very active in the privacy area. Colorado, for instance, has acted particularly slowly. Other than
various restrictions on the dissemination of information concerning people
172
who apply for welfare assistance, little Colorado privacy law exists.

IV.
A.

TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF PRIVACY

Transborder Data Flows

The development of complex computer systems, with greatly enhanced
data processing capabilities enabling vast quantities of data to be transmitted within seconds across national frontiers, has made it necessary to consider international privacy protection of personal data. Privacy protection
laws have been, or will shortly be, introduced in approximately half of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to prevent violations of certain fundamental human rights.' 73 The privacy rights having considerable bearing on international law include:
unlawful storage of personal data, storage of inaccurate data, and abuse or
74
unauthorized disclosure of such data.1
While certain countries have enacted legislation aimed at protecting individual privacy, there is a danger that disparities in national legislation
might hamper the international flow of appropriate and necessary personal
data. Such data flows have increased significantly in recent years and are
bound to grow with the continued widespread use of computer and telecom171. Cope, supra note 164, at 730-43.
172. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-1-114 (1982).
173. The OECD has 24 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Members who have introduced privacy protection laws are: Austria,
Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United
States. Belgium, Iceland, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom have prepared draft bills. OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1981).

174. Id. at 5.
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munication technology. 175 Overly restrictive or disparate legal constraints
could lead to serious disruptions in sectors of the international economy such
176
as banking and insurance.
A recent report by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations outlines the issues in the international regulation of transborder data flows. ' 77 The difficulty of the problems involved
can be observed from that report which noted, inter ah'a, the following kinds
of situations: 1) a diversified consumer products company rented a house
which straddled the border of two European countries to maintain the option of having computer tapes in the venue most expedient to management
purposes;' 1 7 2) a German multinational corporation established a central
personnel information system in Sweden for administration and planning.
This system contained information concerning the family, nationality, and
skills of its employees. Company officials were not permitted to export this
information;' 7 9 3) a United States company complained that its whollyowned subsidiary in Germany is required by German banking law to process
totally within that country. Thus, the computer hardware, software, and
operations must be located in Germany, thereby, excluding the economies of
on-line processing from its Chicago data center.18 0
These problems are due, in part, to individual nations passing disparate
privacy protection laws to control what many argue is an inherently international commodity-information. 18 According to Professor Nanda: "[International] law has been rather slow in responding to the 'information
revolution'-the development and application of technology in electronics
and information processing, and application of technology in electronics, resulting in sophisticated computers, cable and two-way television, direct
broadcast satellites, and the like.' 8 2 Nanda argues, however, that a rush to
pass laws limiting transborder data could upset the "balance between the
needs and interests of society for free flow of information and of the individ183
ual for adequate safeguards of personal data and protection of privacy."'
Present legal norms primarily apply to issues that can be fixed to a definable geographic locus, where responsibility can be attached and jurisdiction can be established. Data transmission and storage do not follow formal
geographic boundaries. Traditional legal approaches have, therefore,
proven unsatisfactory to governments attempting to maintain control over
personal computer databanks. A related problem is where responsibility lies
175. For .adetailed discussion concerning transnational data flow regulation, see Patrick,
Prvacy Restrictions on TransnationalData Flows." A Comparisonof the Council of Europe Draft Convention
and OECD Guidelines, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 405 (1981).
176. Id

177.
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FLOW: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

178. Id at 24.
179.
180.
181.
182.
ting, 30
183.

Id at 18.
Id at 17.
Patrick, supra note 175, at 406.
Nanda, The Communication Revolution and the Free Flow ofInformation in a TransnationalSetAM. J. COMP. L. 411 (1982).
Id at 412.

1983]

COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY

with respect to internal data networks and commercial timesharing services
that operate across national borders. Four possible parties to whom responsibility may be attached in a fairly simple data communication transaction
are: the originator of the data message, the telecommunications carrier, the
data processor, and the recipient of the data.
Two major legal issues surround transnational data flows. The first
concerns the instruments that governments must develop in order to know
what computerized data exists. The second involves the legal framework
that can be developed to assure that agreements among various public and
private parties can be enforced to enable the continuous, uninterrupted flow
of data vital to economic prosperity and national security.
Data flowing across borders is affected by two jurisdictions. As the internal laws of countries differ, the legal assessment of the data and its uses
may also differ. The thrust of legislative efforts has been to regulate personal
information. Some law exists for regulating telecommunications and economic information, however, regulation of transborder data flows is almost
nonexistent.
A fairly common area to consider with respect to potential regulation is
data throughflow. This involves transportation of information across a
country without the data being used in that country. For instance, in transmitting data from Germany to the United States, data might be transmitted
telephonically to London and then by satellite or undersea cable to the
United States. England is a passive way-station in the data flow between
Germany and the United States. Some data processing, however, may occur
in London. One example is the creation of a temporary file for more efficient transmission. The data are not used in England and typically do not
include information on English subjects. Consequently, there will rarely be
any English privacy problems associated with this data throughflow. There
may be little reason to restrict such throughflow with national legislation. In
contrast, if Sweden were the throughflow country, Swedish law places restrictions on the creation of a machine-readable file.i84 Although the file is
temporary, Swedish legislation governs. 185 The file could not be established
8 6
without prior issuance of a license by the Swedish government.i
A second area to consider in developing sound regulations is the use of
foreign service bureaus where processing of data for use in one country takes
place outside that country. The privacy issue is not involved with the nature
of the data processed, but rather with the effect of the relevant national privacy legislation that governs where the data are processed.
A third area is the nature and extent of data collected in one country to
be marketed in another country. Examples include information relating to
subscriptions to foreign periodicals and foreign credit reporting for credit
cards and other forms of credit. As the economies of different countries become more interrelated, the sharing of personal information by credit reporting agencies becomes increasingly significant. Many countries, particularly
184.

Data Act of Sweden, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 2 (July 1, 1979).

185. Id §2.
186. Id.
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those in Scandinavia, have severely restricted the use of data among credit
87
reporting agencies in foreign countries.1
A fourth area to consider is the growth of multinational corporations.
When companies expand across national borders, a need for personal data to
be transmitted across those boundaries arises. Companies engaged in international trade communicate commercial and personnel information between
countries. Employees tend to be more concerned about privacy issues than
suppliers or clients because of the nature of data stored in personnel files.
Two approaches have been taken to restrict access to personnel data. Swe188
Norden requires a license to create and export personnel information.
access
to
on
and
restrictions
data
agreements
way has incorporated
for
local
management
and
personnel data into contracts between employees
and multinational corporations.1 89
Outside the personal data context, transnational data regulations constrain the movement of data across national borders. These constraints conflict with the administrative and technological programs of most
multinational organizations.
A traditional tenet of national sovereignty has been the ability of a
country to manage its economic and social activities. Telecommunications
and computer technology have the potential of reducing the ability of a
country to manage its internal activities. For example, Canada is concerned
about the drain of computerized data to the United States, and its inability
to control this drain effectively. According to the Canadian Minister of Science and Technology: "Transnational data flow has created the potential of
growing dependence, rather than interdependence, and with it the dangers
of loss of legitimate access to vital information and the danger that industrial
and social development will be governed by decisions of interest groups residing in another country."' 19 Similar concerns have been voiced in France,
where the economic data bases used to develop monthly and quarterly forecasts of European economic trends are designed in the United States and
disseminated in Europe via networks owned by American firms.
Many nations are attempting to protect their computer industries and
job bases through privacy legislation aimed at gaining an economic advantage over other nations in the areas of computers and data processing.
Stricter privacy legislation encourages the storage of information in computers within that country. Information processing is a field in which
thousands of jobs could be lost to foreign nations. Developing viable national information industries with the necessary technical infrastructure
must be considered by these nations in developing legislation.
Telecommunications falls within this area because each nation's laws
and policies will affect the services telecommunications carriers offer. The
187. Id §11.
188. id
189. Norwegian Personal Data Registers Act, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 5, § I

(May 18, 1977).
190. Address by J. Hugh Faulkner, Canadian Minister of Science and Technology, before
the United Nations (Aug. 1977).
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telecommunication rates and tariffs levied by governments will affect transborder data flows. Finally, the way in which telecommunication carriers
view their role in new fields, such as electronic funds transfer, electronic
mail, interactive home communications, and international data traffic monitoring, will also have a major affect on transborder data flows.
One reason for processing data in a specific country may be to obtain
special protection for personal information. Personal data files could easily
be placed outside the jurisdiction of the country in which the persons are
located. Consequently, national authorities would need multi-party governmental agreements to obtain disclosure of a particular personal data file.
Another reason for placing a data file under the jurisdiction of a foreign
country having stricter privacy legislation is to encourage people to store
privileged personal information. Consequently, the high privacy standards
of a country will be associated with the high standards of the data company.
The most obvious reason for moving personal data files and processing
to a foreign country is that more lenient privacy legislation may exist in that
country. Such countries are known as "data havens" and represent a substantial problem with respect to transborder data flows. It is feared that
national privacy legislation will be ineffective due to transborder
"datadrains." This fear is well-placed, primarily because of the practical
difficulties in attempting to control foreign data drains. For example, it is
difficult to determine the legality of the use of merged data in files in a foreign country whose privacy laws allow such mergers but where the use takes
place in a country whose laws do not allow for such mergers. This problem
is a major threat to the establishment of effective international privacy
legislation.
B.

Selected Examples of Foreign Pr'oacy Legislation
1.

Canada

Protection of privacy has been incorporated into the Canadian Human
Rights Act (Act). 19 ' The Act requires annual publication of a catalogue
identifying each federal information bank, the type of records contained,
and their derivati<e uses. i92 Exceptions to this requirement concern information on international relations, national security, federal-provincial relations, and law enforcement.' 9 3 The act grants an individual the right to
inspect records containing information about himself and to correct inaccurate information. 1 1 4 A member of the Canadian Human Rights Commission is designated a Privacy Commissioner in charge of receiving and
investigating complaints arising under the Act.' 9 5
British Columbia enacted a Privacy Act in 1968, creating a tort action
for willful invasion of privacy.'9 6 Proof of damages is not required.' 9 7 No
191. Act of July 14, 1977, ch. 33, 1976-77 Can. Stat. 887.
192. Id. § 51(1).

193.

d. §§ 53, 54.

194.

d. §§ 2(b), 52.

195. Id § 58.
196. 5 B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 336 (1979). Seealso TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 137.
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other nation has enacted a privacy tort. The Privacy Act in the United
States provides only a civil cause of action for damages.' 9 8
Quebec enacted a Consumer Protection Act (Act)' 99 in 1972. Sections
forty-three and forty-six allow individuals to examine credit reports and register comments. The Act, however, has no provisions to ensure the accuracy
of credit reports since it lacks specific requirements and procedures for correcting false information.
Saskatchewan enacted the Credit Reporting Agencies Act, 2° ° which is
penal in nature and regulates credit reporting agencies through licensing.
The licensed agencies are governed by rules requiring: release of information, the recording of only certain data, disclosure to the individual, registration of disagreements, and informing recipients that certain facts have been
20 1
disputed.
2.

Sweden

The major privacy legislation in Sweden is the Data Act of 1973
(Act). 20 2 The Act prohibits computer databanks from holding personal information without the permission and supervision of the Swedish Data Inspection Board. 20 3 The Board's regulations extend to: the type of data that
may be collected, the design and technical equipment of the data systems,
notice and access to the public, disclosure of information, storage of data,
and security. 2° 4 Penal sanctions for negligent or willful violations of the Act
include fines and imprisonment of up to one year. 20 5 A two-year sentence
may be imposed for unauthorized access or alteration of data, referred to as
"data trespass." 20 6 Civil liability for damages may result from inaccurate
20 7
information.
3.

West Germany

West Germany's Data Protection Act 20 8 subjects databanks to criminal
sanctions for privacy violations. 20 9 In 1976, the Federal Data Protection
Law (FDPL) was enacted which regulates the type of information that may
be stored, processed, and transmitted.2 10 The FDPL bars use of certain confidential data.2 1 ' Data processing is protected when an individual consents
197. Id
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1976); O.E.C.D., POLICY ISSUES IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 13 (1974).
199. Ch. 74, 1971 Que. Stat.
200. Ch. 23, 1972 Sask. Stat.
201. Id
202. COMPUTER L. SERV., supra note 184.
203. Id

204. Id § 6.
205. Id § 20.

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id
Id § 23.
Data Protection Act, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a (Oct. 7, 1970).
Id at 6.

210. Id at 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 3 (Jan. 1, 1978).
211. Id § 1.
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or legal authorization exists concerning the data's use. 21 2 Once a data file is
created, the individual must, upon request, be provided with information on
stored data concerning him. 2 13 Individual access is denied under the FDPL
where it would prejudice the function of the data base. 21 4 Time limitations
for the retention of data bases are not specified, but are determined by
need. 2 15 The German law lacks a provision for notification of disputes between individuals and databanks. Individuals may, however, report their
2 16
differences to the Data Protection Officer.
4.

France

2 17
The French Data Processing, Files, and Liberties Law of 1978 (Law)
created a supervisory Commission to enforce and regulate implementation of
the Law. An unusual provision is that databanks must disclose to the public
their authorization, purpose, access rights, categories of information, and recipient organizations. 21 8 An individual's right of access is subject to a preliminary inquiry by the Commission, which determines the relevance and
necessity of the disclosure. 2 19 If the Commission decides in favor of the individual, the databank must release a copy of the file. 220 No provision exists,
however, for resolving disputes between individuals and databanks.

5.

Norway, Denmark, and Austria

The Norwegian Personal Data Registers Act 22 1 mandates the legal presumption of obsoleteness of any unfavorable personal credit information
more than five years old. 222 The Austrian Privacy Act of 1978223 requires
databank users to correct or delete inaccurate or incomplete information on
individuals. 224 The burden of proving the accuracy of the information lies
with the user, not the individual or databank. 225 The Danish Private Registers Act 226 requires that when a credit bureau discovers inaccurate information on an individual the bureau must: make the necessary corrections,
notify the individual, and send corrected reports to those who have re22 7
quested credit information within the past six months.
The previous discussion illustrates that a number of nations have begun
to realize the importance of protecting confidential, personal information.
212. Id. § 3.

213. Id § 13.
214. Id
215. Id

§ 14.

216. Id § 21.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

France: Law No. 78-17, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 4 (Jan. 6, 1978).
Id. art. 22.
Id art. 21.
Id
COMPUTER L. SERV., supra note 189.
Id § 15.
5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 8 (Oct. 18, 1978).
Id § 11(1).
Id
5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 6 (June 8, 1978).
Id § 14.
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Their privacy laws suggest some basic principles that could be incorporated
into privacy legislation in the United States.
V.
A.

POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS TO PROTECT PRIVACY

Industy Sef-Disct'rhne

Self-discipline by the computerized credit industry is one inexpensive
control. By developing a professional code of ethics, credit reporting agencies could police themselves. The Code of Ethics for the Association of
Credit Bureaus of Canada serves as a tool for self-discipline in the Canadian
credit reporting industry. 228 Disadvantages of the system are that no specific
person or entity may be held accountable for breaches of the code and that
no specific penalties or authority exist to ensure compliance. Enforcement of
'229
the code is based on "moral suasion.
B.

Ombudsman

An ombudsman does not have regulatory or legislative powers, however, he can recommend regulations and legislation. The ombudsman could
report to Congress periodically and publicize adverse effects of data collection and invasions of privacy.2 30 Suggested functions of the ombudsman
include: considering specific injuries from misuse of information; advising
and commenting on potential databank development; researching data classification; adjudicating complaints; establishing professional standards; examining types of information stored and used; licensing databanks; requiring
periodic reports on systems procedures by operators of databanks; and approving the interchange or collation of information between systems. The
simplicity and low cost of the ombudsman approach makes it particularly
attractive. The ombudsman could immediately respond to an individual's
privacy concerns. One problem, however, is that the ombudsman does not
review systemic problems. Instead, he concentrates on individual databanks
and individual complaints. Also, there can be no investigation until a complaint has been made. Difficulties may also arise when the ombudsman
lacks the technical expertise to analyze a problem. 23 1 The concept of the
ombudsman has never been widely understood or accepted in the United
232
States. Implementing such a system, therefore, could prove difficult.
C. Single Identification Number
A single identification number (SIN) for all records and information on
an individual could reduce the social harm caused by identification errors.
A SIN system compiles and retrieves information quickly and cost-effectively. It would promote centralization of data which could facilitate imple228. See TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 164.

229. Id.
230. Id at 162. See also R. FREED, COMPUTERS AND LAW: A REFERENCE WORK 42 (1976).
231. See TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 162.
232. See R. FREED, rupra note 230, at 42.
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233
mentation of other technical controls. Germany employs a SIN system.
Under that system, if a person changes his residence only one agency is notified; other agencies are notified automatically. Sweden, Norway, Finland,
and Denmark also have SIN systems. 23 4 Sweden uses a ten digit number,
which refers to an individual's birthdate, geographic location, and check
number. 23 5 Although there have been proposals for SIN systems in the
United States and Canada; neither country has adopted one. A proposal in
the United States to utilize social security numbers as the basis of a SIN
system was abandoned in 1970.236

Opponents argue that SIN systems can be abused and result in the loss
of anonymity. 23 7 Other risks associated with personal data, particularly
computerized credit information, may not be eliminated by a SIN system.
By reducing the identification factors to a single number, the possibilities for
mismatching information on an individual may be increased. Errors made
with respect to the assignment of the SIN could result in the information on
an individual being lost or destroyed.
D.

Centralized Databanks

Centralized databanks serve a function similar to the SIN system. Centralization standarizes all records into one central intelligence system. Like
the SIN, the centralized databank concept is attacked because of the potential for too much power and control. In an investigation by the House Special Subcommittee on Invasions of Privacy in 1966, the concern for misuse
and control became paramount. 238 Public discussions indicated the need for
a system of safeguards through federal legislation which would include coding procedures, codes of conduct, and a system for data verifications. Centralized databanks might perpetuate facts without methods or provisions for
Another privacy consideration is the high
updating the information.
probability of error that exists when data are collected from several sources.
E.

Open Access

Open access provides a means of holding the databank and its personnel accountable.23 9 In Canada, an individual who disagrees with the infor24 °
Legal problems arise when
mation may insert statements into the file.
someone other than the individual inspects the record, as in the case of minors or incompetents. 24 1 If access is extended to include sources and uses of
the information, an undue burden might be placed on the custodian of the
233. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 86.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id at 87.
Id
Id.
Id. at 85.

Hearngs Before the Special Subcomm. on invasions of Privacy ofthe House Comm. on Governmental
Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
239. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at

59.
240. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 155.

241.
150.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note

42,

at
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data thereby increasing the difficulty of obtaining confidential information.2 4 2 Costs in providing access present another problem. In 1972, the
Younger Committee estimated that mailing a complete printout on every
2 43
individual in the United States could cost around $2 million plus postage.
Reports including a full explanation of the codes could cost twice as
much. 244 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 allows databanks to charge
an individual requesting access. 245 It is ironic that such a request and the
subsequent visit to the databank allows the databank to gather more infor24 6
mation on the individual.
F. Systems Controls
Given the massive yet inexpensive storage capacities, it may be more
costly to delete or update data than to retain it. Limitations can be placed
on the kind of data that may be collected. 24 7 Guidelines concerning updating and deleting data can be implemented. 248 Nevertheless, problems still
arise concerning the accuracy of data. Factual mistakes should clearly be
corrected. The issue, however, is complicated when accuracy is a question of
context. For example, an accurate account of unpaid debts may present a
biased view without an explanation for nonpayment. If a question of context arises, the individual should be permitted to file a personal accounting.
2 49
This approach is used in Canada.
Data must be protected while in storage. Unauthorized persons who
gain access to the databank could pirate or alter the information. One
method of protecting confidentiality is to keep logs of those who access the
files. Passwords, authentication, and authorization provide additional safeguards. Controls restricting access to the machinery itself may be incorporated into the software program. Physical processing restrictions which
revoke certain features of the computer system also protect stored data.
Data output or dissemination must be protected. Exchanges of information between databanks could be restricted to persons having a demonstrable "need to know" or a common connection with the primary purpose
for which the data was collected. 250 Other controls include: individual approval for data exchanges, approval when the data are used for unintended
25 1
purposes, and regularly providing lists of exchanges to the individual.
G.

Computer Security
252
Security is the technical means by which confidentiality is ensured.

242. Id
243. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 155.
244. Id
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
246. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 156.

247. Id at 150.
248. Id at 151.

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id
Id at 153.
Id
Id
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Passwords, limited access, audit logs, physical security, limitations on data
links, and automatic labeling of sensitive files are examples of computer security. 253 The costs of protecting privacy within a computerized system are
primarily in the area of computer security. The expenses include: analysis,
design and implementation of the protective system, tests and validations,
operation and maintenance, salaries of security personnel, and computer
time and maintenance costs. 254 Hardware security costs include key-cards,
closed circuit television, and shielded transmission cables. 2 55 Password and
audit procedures are added cost factors.
One commentator suggests that safeguards may cost more in "management attention and psychic energy than in dollars. ' 256 These costs should
be regarded as insurance against privacy invasions. Provisions exist that
charge security costs to the subjects of the data rather than to consumers of
the information. Access mechanism expenses, for example, are imposed on
25 7
the individual under the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act.
H.

Cyplo/ogy

Cryptology encompasses signal security and signal intelligence. Signal
security involves keeping secret messages between computers such as telegrams, telephone conversations, and electronic messages. Messages may be
put into secret form by code or cipher. Elements of the message can be
scrambled or replaced by other elements. The receiver, knowing the key to
the encryption, reverses the process to read the original message.
Signal intelligence involves extracting information from transmissions.
These methods include intercepting messages which are in plain language,
electronic impulses, and radio or radar transmissions. Cryptanalysis breaks
the codes or ciphers. Cryptology makes it difficult to intercept messages
passing over lines or by radio signal between users and computer databanks.
As with general databank security measures, cryptology can restrict access to
those having a right to the information. Costs may rise with the use of
cryptology, however, further insurance against privacy intrusions would be
provided.

VI.
A.

FUTURE LEGAL TRENDS TO PROTECT PRIVACY

The United States

Additional legal steps may be taken to ease the tension between the
need for rapid availability of data and the desire to protect privacy rights.
253. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SUpra note 42, at
244; TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 103.
254.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

248.
255. Id.at 249.
256. R. FREED, supra note 230, at 45.
257. N.Y, GEN. Bus. LAw § 380e(e)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981).

supra note 42, at
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Constitutional Amendment and/or Federal Statutes

One commentator argues that a constitutional amendment and federal
statutes are needed: to balance the interests between the need for data and
privacy protections; to restrict access of outsiders to confidential information;
and to provide stricter sanctions and penalties for improper dissemination of
personal data.258 This commentator concludes that federal sanctions and
protections must be implemented because only a nationwide system will ef259
fectively protect privacy rights.
Reliance on state privacy protection systems "will be only as strong as
the weakest state law." 26° In implementing legislation, the following aspects
should be considered: 1) limiting the type of data maintained, 2) controlling
the collection and recording of data, 3) informing an individual of the existence of a file concerning him and disclosing names of persons who have seen
the records, 4) automatically expunging obsolete data, 5) permitting access
to records only on a "need to know" basis, 6) categorizing files as personal or
statistical, 7) easing the obstacles to discovery and proof, 8) limiting access to
on-site retrieval, and 9) restricting the exchange of personal information be26
tween government agencies. '
Those believing that a general right of privacy could be established by
constitutional amendment or federal statute, in effect, propose that courts be
the primary mechanism to enforce privacy rights. An injured party, however, would still need to bring an action. Courts will not initiate actions
against databanks allegedly violating statutes. In today's political climate, it
is unlikely that a constitutional amendment to protect privacy could successfully be enacted.
2.

Federal Control Agency

A federal agency could be established to supervise and control governmental acquisition, storage, and release of computerized information. 262 A
"Data Processing and Management Office" could act as a watchdog over
federal utilization of computerized data and impose sanctions for violations
of privacy standards. If this agency were given authority to register and
license data systems, conformance with privacy safeguards could then be a
263
condition precedent to obtaining a license.
3.

State Control Agency

A state control agency could use licensing and registration to monitor
credit reporting agencies. Granting a state agency broad powers could, however, endanger privacy by giving the state access to confidential data. The
258. Halls, Raiding the Databanks: A Developing Problemfor Technologists and Lawyers, 5 J. OF
CONTEMP. L. 245, 264-65 (1978).

259. Id at 265-66.
260. Id. at 264-65.
261. Id
262. See, e.g. , Comment, Agency Access to Credit Bureau Files: FederalInvarion of rivac?, 12 B.C.
INDUS. AND COMM. L. REV. 125 (1970).

263. Id. at 127.
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agency could be given power to intercede in the event of a violation, but not
the power to correct the situation.264 The advantages of the flexibility of
26 5
such an agency might be outweighed by its potential heavy-handed effect.
Many of the concerns about a state privacy protection system may also be
applicable to a federally-mandated privacy protection system.
4.

Code of Fair Information Practices

A model Code of Fair Information Practices was developed in 1976 by
the Ombudsmen Committee on Privacy of the Association for Computing
Machinery. 266 The code does not distinguish between public and private
sectors. The guidelines apply equally, although it may be more difficult to
control the private sector. A privacy protection code would be a sound foundation upon which states could develop a system for personal privacy, maximizing the utility of the computerization of information while minimizing
267
abuses.

B.

Transnational Trends

Governments recognize that information is a powerful resource with
political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. They are, therefore,
264. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at

92.
265. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 160.
266. OMBUDSMEN COMM. ON PRIVACY, Ass'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY 72-79 (1976).
267. The code contains the following recommendations:
1. There should be no information system containing personally identifiable data
whose existence is unknown to the data subject;
2. Personally identifiable data should not be collected unless the information system
is safeguarded by a level of security commensurate with the sensitivity of the
information;
3. There must be a reasonable method for the individual to find out what information is stored on him or her and how that information is used;
4. There should be no disclosure of any personal information to any organization or
individual until the data subject has given permission for the disclosure in writing.
Such permission may be revoked by the individual at any time, and if it is not revoked, the permission shall expire automatically at the end of one year;
5. Personally identifiable information collected for one purpose shall not be used for
any other purpose without the knowledge and consent of the data subject;
6. In the event of a demand made by means of a compulsory legal proceeding, a
reasonable attempt should be made to contact the data subject and to advise him or
her of the demand prior to such information being given to the authorities;
7. There must be a reasonable method for an individual to contest the accuracy and
completeness, pertinence and necessity of the data; to have data corrected, amended,
or expunged if it is inaccurate or dated; and to assure that when there is a disagreement about a correction or expungement, the individual's claim is noted and included
in subsequent disclosures;
8. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating confidential information must assure its reliability for intended use and take precautions to prevent
misuse of such confidential information;
9. Before creating a databank containing confidential information, a study should be
completed to demonstrate the necessity for the information system as well as the relevancy of the collected data to its intended use. The concept of "useful life" should also
be addressed; and
10. An individual should have the right to have the personal information removed
from any file if the organization maintaining it cannot show any legal, useful, specific,
and productive purpose for maintaining it.
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motivated to consider implementing control mechanisms to promote national interests in the area of privacy. Public and private collectors, users,
processors, and transmitters of this information realize that such mechanisms
can result in constraints and costs attaching to transnational data flows and
can see to participate in these governmental decisions.
The OECD and Council of Europe have taken major initiatives toward
establishing an international legal regime concerning transborder data
flows. 2 68 Recommendations from both organizations recognize the need to
balance privacy protection and the free flow of information. In the opinion
of one commentator, the most significant of the OECD principles is the Individual Participation Principle which:
recognizes the right of an individual to obtain confirmation regarding the existence of data pertaining to the individual; to have such
data communicated to him or her within a reasonable time in a
reasonable manner and intelligible form at a charge, if any, which
is not excessive; to be given reasons for the denial of such request
and the opportunity to challenge such denial; and to challenge
data relating to the individual and have it erased, rectified, com269
pleted or amended if the challenge is successful.
In 1980, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data.2 70 It was opened for signature at Strasbourg, Germany on January 28,
1981271 and seeks to protect individual privacy while allowing for the free
flow of data across frontiers. Unlike the nonbinding recommendations of the
OECD Guidelines, legally enforceable rights are established in countries
272
that become parties to the Convention.
Third World nations are attempting to develop high technology com273
puter industries and will eventually face transnational data flow issues.
They will probably ask multinational corporations for assistance and access
to databanks containing information on economic forecasting, marketing,
and statistical research. These countries will play a more active role in decisions concerning international communications policies and data flows.
CONCLUSION

An international convention ensuring that privacy protections are
maintained is necessary. Increasing interdependence among nations compels the development of binding agreements to govern information flows
while ensuring protection of personal privacy. Without such protection, continued development and sharing of computer and telecommunication technology may not occur at a pace beneficial to all parties involved. Without
268. Nanda, supra note 182, at 422-24.
269. Id at 423.
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international protections, the abuses in areas of illegal data storage, inaccurate data transmissions, and unauthorized data disclosures could continue at
an alarming rate.

